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2. The public, too, is part of the problem. (In contrast to the inference drawn by Yankelovich; and by the Freeze campaign).

3. We have succeeded in raising fears of nuclear but not of the nuclear arms race.

4. People oppose the combat use of nuclear weapons, but not the threatened use of nuclear weapons.

5. In fact, the efforts to make threats credible drive the arms race.

6. Moreover, the arms race is proceeding into a zone of greatly increased danger (instability: preemption, launch on warning) as well as becoming increasingly more difficult to halt or reverse.

7. Although people do support Reagan's general policy--which, contrary to Yank. they do understand adequately--their support reflects great ignorance of: a) the actual risks of past and current threats (the degree to which they are not bluffs; the tendency to make them in less than "vital" circumstances; the decreasing likelihood that they will "work", and that some will be carried out: because of actual commitment, or to maintain future credibility...)

(b) the link between the threats and the arms buildup;

c) the newly increased dangers of the specific new weapons being added.

8. These are matters the Freeze can address, inform the public; with the reasonable aim of eroding public support for nuclear threats, and creating a sense of urgency in the public about averting the impending weapons that are destabilizing.

9. The public can act on this urgency by pressuring Congress to reject these weapons unilaterally and/or making funding conditional on Soviet testing and deployment of similar weapons.

10. It is unrealistic to hope for a full comprehensive freeze from Congress; or any sort of initiative or compliance from Reagan.

11. Actually attaining any of these measures against the will of the President may be unlikely in the next two or even four years; but education of the public oriented to and producing pressure on Congress in this direction can help in changing the composition of Congress in 9-1986 and the Presidency in 1988. And it would make it possible to take quick advantage of changes in the political environment: including a dramatic overture from the SU.

(Earlier: Both the Freeze and Yank believed: The public is highly concerned about the risks of nuclear war. And (Yank) the public strongly supports a no-first-use policy; or, the public strongly opposes current NATO/US policy which contemplates (threatens, prepares) first-use of nuclear weapons.

In fact, the public is concerned about the risks associated with an actual nuclear war; it is quite divided and uncertain as to how to reduce those risks, whether and how the arms race is related to them, and whether increasing or reducing arms spending would reduce them.

--Our achievements, when and if any, will be through Congress (or eventually, a new President); and they will require further education of the public, on matters we have not much addressed in the past: FU policy and history, the risks of threat-making, the effects on the arms race of our threat-policy, the specific risks associated with the current phase of the arms race.

--We can stop talking about the 'Freeze as the first step'---but we have given little thought about what to do before and in the absence of a Freeze.

The two candidates did not offer a real choice on nuclear policy; but there is little evidence that the public demanded one, or a change from past policy, despite all our efforts--which did change attitudes in a number of respects. Yank. reports this change, coincident with our campaign:

They no longer see arms buildup or race as necessary (though they don't want the race lost) or promising, or superiority as attainable or necessary. But there is no evidence they see it as the source of danger; hence as urgently demanding to be stopped.'

We must convey urgency; by new information and arguments; linking the new destabilizing/first-strike weapons to our threat-policy and to new dangers of nuclear war. Danger, not waste, is the basis of urgency, along with the imminence of weapons of new, dangerous characteristics.

The kinds of restrictions being contemplated in Geneva will neither lower the risks of the arms race nor the risks of our threat-policy.



There are a lot of Americans who have believed for several years that it is a matter of urgency and high priority to end the nuclear arms race, by means of a bilateral US/Soviet Freeze. I am one of them: a member for two years of the Strategy Task Force of the National Freeze Campaign. Those of us who have devoted most of our time to this issue are aware that there are many who agree with us wholeheartedly, that we are part of a large and growing active movement. But just how widely are our views--in particular, our sense of social and personal priorities--shared by the larger public?

740 Polls showing steady 75-80% support for a bilateral Freeze have encouraged us to believe that our own attitudes on this issue *have come* represented ~~majority~~ majority opinion among Americans. But that is put into question, to say the least, by events over the last year. Reagan's landslide, above all, means that half or more of those who told pollsters they supported a Freeze voted for Reagan.

111 Granted that that Reagan had learned to talk the language of arms control and to send representatives to Geneva, in contrast to his first year in office. Granted that Mondale featured his own "support" for the Freeze proposal so imperceptibly in the fall campaign and in the debates with Reagan that he did not clearly offer an alternative to Reagan's traditional arms control approach: which has proved compatible for a generation with an accelerating and increasingly dangerous arms race. The question remains, why didn't he? Why didn't his elaborate sampling of public opinion tell him he ought to? Would he surely have done much better if he had?

Other ~~experience~~ *phenomena* raises the same questions. Reagan's ability to convince the public that he is sincerely seeking significant agreements in Geneva, and the lack of public criticism of his known proposals; Congressional funding, however reluctant, of the MX, and lack of reluctance to pursue all the other strategic weapons programs endangering stability (e.g. Trident II, Pershing II) or verifiability (SLCMs); public and Congressional tolerance of the SDI, with its threat of blocking any hope of arms limitations, sparking a hyperbolic offensive and defensive race, and increasing the risk of preemptive attack... In face of all this, it seems wishful to imagine that any large fraction of that 80% of the population share our activist sense of the urgency or high social priority of ending the nuclear arms race.

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